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BISHOP BUTLER AND CARDINAL NEWMAN ON RELIGIOUS CERTITUDE

GEORGE E. HORR

NEWTON THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION

Until within the memory of men little past middle life Butler's *Analogy* was a standard text-book in American Colleges, and up to 1850 it was among the books for the final examinations in the University of Oxford. Recently it has been brought into fresh prominence by the publication of Gladstone's *Subsidiary Studies*, and by the sumptuous edition of Butler's works issued by the Oxford University Press, to the preparation of which Mr. Gladstone devoted the last months of his illustrious career. Furthermore, within a short time two critical biographies of Butler have been published, one by W. Lucas Collins, Prebendary of Peterborough, and one by W. A. Spooner, Tutor of New College, Oxford, and Canon of Christ Church. The interest in Cardinal Newman is perennial, and fresh appreciations of his philosophy and of his unique personality are continually appearing.

Let us ask, What was the attitude of these representative men toward the question of religious certitude? What were the criteria which each would apply to ethical and religious data in order that they may be stamped with the mark of certitude? What tests, in their opinion, would justify the judgment that we are sure that this or that statement of religious or ethical truth is true?

An exhaustive discussion of these matters involves, of course, the fundamental problems of epistemology and metaphysics: How is knowledge possible? What is the true nature of reality? These, however, are not the realms in which either Butler or Newman moved.

Our course of thought may be conveniently outlined as follows:

I. The doctrine of Butler's *Analogy*.
II. The influence of this doctrine upon English theological

thought and upon the school in which Newman was trained.

III. Newman's own doctrine.

IV. The contributions of Newman and Butler toward a more comprehensive view.

I

Throughout the *Analogy* Butler concedes that the argument for the Christian revelation is one that leads to a greater or less degree of probability on its behalf: he nowhere claims that it is demonstrative or conclusive. Of course every one admits that there is a degree of probability which gives practical certitude. Butler maintains, however, with all his vigor, that, since the preponderance of evidence is on the side of the revelation, a rational man is justified in accepting it and in acting upon it as if it were conclusive. The maxim that probability is the guide of life he fearlessly applies to belief as well as to conduct. In his *Subsidiary Studies* Mr. Gladstone repeatedly calls attention to the wisdom of Butler's counsel that, on the one hand, the amount of belief which is yielded to any conclusion must be measured by the amount and character of the evidence which can be adduced in support of it; but that, on the other hand, in all practical matters, and in religion especially, we have to content ourselves with an amount of evidence which falls far short of demonstration. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to ascertain on which side the balance of evidence lies; then to close the case, and to act with as much courage and directness as though the evidence had actually reached the point of demonstration. The action of which Butler makes so much is not simply the performance of the deeds inculcated by religion: in many passages Butler makes it plain that he is contemplating the acceptance on the part of men of the Biblical revelation itself. According to the *Analogy*, and according to Mr. Gladstone, the disposition to determine our beliefs and our behavior by the balance of evidence is the secret of life here and of life hereafter.

Mr. Gladstone is certainly right in extolling the philosophy of the *Analogy* as an excellent discipline for the business man

and the statesman. Whether or not it is a sound religious philosophy is open to some doubt.

There is something peculiarly robust and British in this doctrine. What could be more in accord with the practical, commonsense bent of English human nature than to weigh the evidence, make up your mind, and then act as if all the evidence had been on one side? That is what the English business man and statesman have always done. Why is not the principle equally applicable to religion? The Englishman who gave attention to such matters believed that it was. Mr. Gladstone says over and over again that it is. The evidence does not give you certitude; but you have a constructive certitude by striking a balance of the evidence, closing the case, and then acting as if the evidence had been conclusive. That is the way we act in every-day affairs; that is the principle upon which law is administered; that is a sound principle in religion.

It is singular that Butler stands almost alone among the greater English writers in his failure to exert any appreciable influence upon the Continent. A German translation of the *Analogy* appeared at Leipzig in 1756, and a second translation in 1787; a French translation had practically no circulation. Mr. Gladstone notes that Zart's enumeration of the forty-eight British authors who influenced German thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries does not include his name.[1] This is the more peculiar when we recall the influence of Locke upon the French Encyclopedists, and of Hume upon Kant. The truth is that the hard, mechanical, legal view of religious matters which Butler's doctrine of Probability involves is not congenial to the modern Latin mind, nor to the Germanic temperament with its instinct for inwardness. Locke and Hume are hard enough, but an attractive personality gleams through their discussions. They are frequently dry, but they are never gritty.

The fatal objection to the constructive certitude which Butler's argument establishes is that it is not real: it is constructive. The process which Butler recommends is too much like the act of an unskilful accountant, who, unable to detect the error in his reckonings, forces a balance. When not only action but belief is in-

[1] Einfluss der Englischen Philosophie. Berlin, 1881.

volved in the transaction, that is just the process that the mind repudiates as illicit. We can easily close the case in an affair of behavior, and treat the preponderance of evidence as conclusive. We cannot do that in a case of belief; for the mind cannot honestly yield its assent unless it is convinced, and it cannot be convinced so long as the evidence itself is not conclusive. In religion the conviction itself is the main matter. In religion the action which does not come from a convinced mind and a spirit at peace with itself is of a meagre, prudential type, and utterly destitute of that exultant confidence and self-abandon which are the springs of Christian devotion and heroism. It is utterly impossible to imagine an ideal Christian character built upon Pascal's wager, or upon any such basis as action upon the preponderance of the evidence.

Indeed, men have no right to treat their minds as Butler's principle would suggest. It is immoral to consider insufficient evidence as sufficient. Such a course involves a wrench to the normal operations of the intellect comparable to the injury done a fine watch by throwing a wheel out of its plane. The mind cannot be forced to a belief by an act of the will. That is not what the phrase "the will to believe" means. Strictly speaking, of course, no mind can believe what it does not believe. What actually takes place in the course we are describing is that the man tampers with his own processes. Henceforth his faculties do not function properly, and all of their products come under legitimate suspicion. Many of the unveracities and self-deceptions of truly religious minds have their origin in a pressure to believe.

II

Let us now glance at the relation of the *Analogy* to English theological thought and to the Evangelical School in which Newman was trained. The *Analogy* exercised a profound influence upon English thought. It did this in two ways. It substituted constructive for real certitude, and it restricted the so-called "evidences" to the external and formal accompaniments of Christianity.

No one can read the theological literature of England from

Hooper to Doddridge without being convinced of its pre-eminent spirituality. That is why Latimer and Baxter, Howe, Owen, Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and even Laud himself, have survived. It is a great literature. The thinking is not fundamental, but within its limits it is sane, thorough, and robust. Now what was the doctrine of English theologians during this period as to the bases of Christian certitude? It found consummate expression in the article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession. Dean Stanley said[2] that this article and the chapters on Justification in the Decrees of Trent are the ablest creedal statements of the ages. Perhaps, however, as Professor Philip Schaff suggested,[3] it may be more aptly compared with the Tridentine decree on Scripture and Tradition and the Vatican decree on the dogmatic constitution of the Catholic Faith. The Westminster article reads:

> We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

We may notice in passing that the source of this article is Calvin's *Institutes*.[4] This doctrine of the Testimonium Spiritus Sancti is not only the doctrine of the Puritans, but it underlies the whole body of English religious thought from Latimer to Tillotson (1630–1694). It is not often elaborated, but it is there. In the second and third generations after the Continental reformations, theologians began to feel that the doctrine of the Testimonium afforded too much play for the subjectivity of the individual,

[2] Contemporary Review, 1874, p. 499.

[3] Creeds of Christendom, I, 767.

[4] Institutes, I, vii.

and they substituted for it the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Scripture, which came to mean the inspiration and authority of the dominant creed or theologian.

The doctrine of the Testimonium is undoubtedly a variety of mysticism; and the important thing to notice is that the early reformers, Continental and English, and the great body of English theologians down to the revolution (1688), reached certitude by the mystic path. They admitted that arguments about revelation would lead to a high persuasion as to the probability of its authority, but certitude—the full assurance beyond the shadow of a doubt—they believed came from the witness of the Holy Spirit. The theology of the eighteenth century is at a positive disadvantage compared with that of the seventeenth in its substitution of constructive for real certitude—a substitution which was in part due to the influence of Butler.

The influence of the *Analogy* was seen in another direction. A variety of forces was at work leading to an over-emphasis upon the external features of the Christian revelation. The old Arminianism of Holland, which entered England soon after the Synod of Dort and had been espoused by Archbishop Laud, placed the strongest reliance upon miracles and prophecy as the sufficient credentials of revelation. The influence of the great jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was almost wholly in this direction. The rapidly increasing vogue of the philosophy of Locke; the speculations of the English Deists; the answers elicited from such men as Leslie, Sherlock, and Conybeare; and the revolution itself which seated William and Mary on the throne, substituting for an inherent authority in the royal line the external force of the public will—all these tendencies were in the direction of making the Christian evidences purely external and formal, and the influence of the *Analogy* fell in with the popular drift and strengthened it.

In passing from Howe (1630–1705) and Doddridge (1702–1751) to Paley (1743–1805) and Blair (1718–1800), you are aware that you have entered into another latitude with another climate. The inward aspects of the Christian revelation are almost ignored. The reasoning moves in the domain of the mechanical and the outward. A comparison of that beautiful work of Doddridge on

the influence of the Spirit[5] with Paley's *Evidences* illustrates the change that had taken place. In the former you are brought into the realm of the responsive, passionate, beautiful life of the soul; in the latter you move in the realm of dry precedents, of the arguments of opposing counsel, and of the balance of probability.

It would be wrong to disparage the vast service the *Analogy* rendered in answering the Deists out of their own mouths; but Butler's triumph over the Deists should not blind us to the formal and unspiritual aspects of Christianity which he emphasized in the *Analogy*.

In thus characterizing the theological drift in England during the eighteenth century we must not forget that there was a remnant of the High Churchmen who were still loyal to the older theology. They are represented by William Law (1686–1761), whose beautiful life and character made a strong impression upon Gibbon,[6] and whose power of reasoning wins a cordial acknowledgment from Sir Leslie Stephen.[7] But the school of Law was only a handful. He was little more than a voice crying in the wilderness.

It was John Wesley who brought back the popular religion of England to its mystic basis. He confesses that he could gain nothing from Law. Probably there was some temperamental barrier between the two men; but what he might have received from Law he gained from his visit to Herrnhut and from the Moravian theology. Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit brought Arminian Methodism to the platform of the Article on the Bible in the Westminster Confession.

The Evangelicals in the Church of England represent the influence of the Wesleyan movement upon the English Church. A study of the Evangelical theology as represented by Romaine, Simeon, and Scott will be apt to leave the impression that the party had the zeal and the devotion of the Wesleyans, but that its theological position had not been thought through. We should never forget that the great philanthropic and missionary move-

[5] Works, I, 472–590.

[6] The Life of Edward Gibbon, Milman Ed. p. 17.

[7] English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, II, 72.

ments of the nineteenth century arose within this party. It gave birth to the Anti-Slavery Society and to the Sunday School movement; to the Naval and Military (1780), and the British and Foreign Bible Societies (1804); to the London Missionary Society (1795) and the Church Missionary Societies (1799). But its good works did not save it. The fate of the Evangelical party is a conclusive demonstration of the necessity of a consistent theology if a Church would lay hold of the forces of human life. It shows that a Church has a mission to thought as well as to sentiment. It is useless to attempt to describe the theology of the Evangelical party in the English Church. It was neither Calvinist nor Arminian. It took something of Wesley's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit, but fitfully and partially. Its attitude toward the question of certitude was that of Butler. The main reason for believing in the Christian revelation was that the balance of probability was in its favor.

This was the school in which the Tractarian leaders, Keble and Newman, were brought up. The mother of Newman was a member of the Huguenot family of Foudrinier. She herself was a moderate Calvinist, and taught her children to read the authors of the English Evangelical School such as Scott, Romaine, Newton, and Milner. Newman says: "The writer who made a deeper impression on my mind than any other, and to whom, humanly speaking, I almost owe my soul, was Thomas Scott of Astor Sanford. I so admired and delighted in his writings that when I was an undergraduate I thought of making a visit to his Parsonage, in order to see a man whom I so deeply revered." [8]

III

Let us now pass to Newman's own doctrine. The Tractarian Movement has been construed from many different points of view, but, so far as Newman was concerned, it was an endeavor to find a firm basis for religious certitude. Beneath all the discussions about the Real Presence, Baptismal Regeneration, Apostolic Succession, the note of the true Church in the English Establishment, and the like, that was the real question.

[8] Apologia, p. 5.

The *Apologia* is the record of the processes of Newman's thought; the *Grammar of Assent* is his exposition of the logic of those processes. These works show that Newman reached certitude by the means of two principles, the self-evidencing power of divine truth and the action of the "illative sense."

A famous passage in the *Apologia* defines his position, and our interpretation of Newman will be largely influenced by our disposition to take this passage at its face value. He says:

> Starting then with the being of God (which, as I have said, is as certain to me as the certainty of my own existence, though when I try to put the grounds of that certainty into logical shape I find a difficulty in doing so in mood and figure to my own satisfaction) I look out of myself into the world of men, and there I see a sight which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world seems to give the lie to that great truth of which my being is so full, and the effect upon me is, in consequence, as a matter of necessity, as confusing as if I denied that I am in existence myself. If I looked into a mirror and did not see my face, I should have the sort of feeling which actually comes upon me when I look into the living, busy world, and see no reflection of its Creator. . . . Were it not for this voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and in my heart, I should be an atheist or a pantheist or a polytheist when I look into the world.[9]

In Newman's inner life the truth of God is self-evidencing, but the external confirmations of that truth are not what he could desire. He would have the rational evidence match the intuitive persuasion. The a priori element in Newman's spiritual development was not the assumption that the Roman or the English Church was the custodian of an infallible external authority, but that somewhere there was an objective witness to God which matched his interior conviction.

There are many resemblances between Pascal and Newman, but there is one important difference. Pascal could write, "The heart has reasons which the reason knows not of." Newman could adopt the kindred motto, "Cor ad cor loquitur." But Pascal, if the fragments of his *Thoughts* reveal him correctly, could and did trust the interior conviction as Newman did not.

[9] Apologia, p. 241 f.

It may have been due to the powerful influence of the school based on Butler's *Analogy* in which he was trained, or it may have been an effect of temperament, but Newman was not content, as Pascal was, to take what external evidence he could find and accept it gratefully as a corroboration of his interior conviction: he insistently demanded that the external evidence should match the interior conviction. This it was which led him to Rome.

In many respects the *Grammar of Assent*, though the least read, is the ablest of Newman's books. It is the most carefully reasoned; its tissue is closest. It was published in 1870, in the full maturity of his powers, after long processes of reflection had clarified his mind. In 1870, no more than in 1845, is he able to believe that the logical understanding can justify the interior conviction, but he holds that the "illative sense" can at least conclusively demonstrate that the Roman Church is the perpetual witness of God in the earth. It should be noted that this doctrine of the illative sense is not an afterthought of Newman. In the *University Sermons*, delivered in his Anglican days, the doctrine is adumbrated. There it appears as "the implicit reason." There is nothing especially recondite about this theory. In a word it is this: our judgments, whether we will or no, are not wholly the product of the logical understanding, but temperamental, sentimental, experiential, and many other considerations enter into them, and rightly so. Evidence addressed to the logical understanding is not so much a test of truth as a path by which we attain access to the truth. The responses and reactions of the human spirit are also pathways to truth.

A familiar illustration may make the point clearer. In an appreciation of an eminent financier the writer says in substance: For a number of years, up to his death, I sat on the board of directors of the X. Y. Co. with Mr. A. Many times I have observed his mental processes. He would listen with absorbed attention to the statement of the facts of a given situation, but I never knew a man more impatient of an argument about the facts. After he had the facts before him and had reviewed them, he reached a conclusion; and he used to amaze the other directors by the insight, sagacity, and adequacy of his judgments. Another thing surprised me. When Mr. A. was called upon to give his

reasons for his conclusion, his argumentation was exceedingly weak. We used to say that almost any member of the board could defend Mr. A.'s policy better than the author of it.

Now what elements entered into those sagacious judgments? Formal logic hardly at all. But first there was a natural business sagacity, akin to the endowment of the artist; then large experience in dealing with similar matters; then a capacity of looking at the whole situation in the large; and then a peculiar insight into human nature, so that he could readily forecast the practicability of his policy.

In what is probably his greatest sermon—that on "Implicit and Explicit Reason"—speaking of the nature of reasoning, Newman says:

> One fact may suffice for a whole theory; one principle may create and sustain a system; one minute token is a clue to a large discovery. The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness that has become a proverb, a subtilty and a versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of an association; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory: and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and a sure foot, ascends, how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him and unable to teach another. . . . And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule but by an inward faculty.[10]

Newman calls this power which enables us to arrive at our conclusions the "illative sense." He likens it to the sense of beauty or to the capacity for dealing with affairs. He illustrates its nature and working in the various departments of human activity. By it the lawyer or the general or the business man or statesman reaches a certitude as to his own conclusions through the response of his whole personality to the situation.

It is a fair question, How far did Newman's reasoning satisfy

[10] University Sermons, p. 256 f.

himself? Why did he restrict the operation of his "illative sense" to the claims of the Roman Church, and not apply it impartially to the whole round of doctrine? The truth probably is that he never really cut himself loose from the old evidential school in which he had been trained at home and in his early days at Oriel. It seems as if he could not have submitted to Rome, after all that he had written in the *Via Media*, except through the working of the views which created a parching thirst for an overwhelming objective authority.

IV

Let us now ask what contribution did these great thinkers make to a more comprehensive theory of certitude? Thus far, in referring to Butler, we have only considered the teaching of the *Analogy*. Butler wrote the *Analogy* against the Deists, and of course he had to meet them on their own ground, and he did not, in an apologetic directed to a certain phase of thought, expound his whole philosophy. In Butler's *Fifteen Sermons* he did work which abides. And no judgment of him is just which does not take into account the specific occasion of the *Analogy* and the doctrine of the *Sermons*. In the *Sermons* Butler regards the voice of conscience as incommensurable with the inferences from evidence. There is a trace of this doctrine in many nuances of the *Analogy*, especially in chapter viii, but in the *Sermons* it is thrown into the boldest relief. The certitude which parallels the certitude of our own existence is the sense of obligation to do right, the conviction of the authority of righteousness. Butler says, "Though a man should doubt of everything else, yet he would still remain under the nearest and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue."[11] The voice of conscience is like a royal invitation. Such an invitation becomes an imperial mandate; it supersedes every other engagement. The structure of human nature makes this sense of obligation its own witness. The vindication of the place and authority of conscience is Butler's superb service to theology. Principal Fairbairn holds that

[11] Analogy, II, 16, Gladstone's Edition.

Butler's doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is inconsistent with his doctrine of probability.[12] Perhaps Butler did not discriminate so sharply as would be well between conscience as a faculty, a function, and a product; or between conscience and the moral consciousness, or between the sense of obligation and moral law, but he laid a firm foundation for moral and religious certitude in his recognition of the nature and place of the authority of righteousness. The truth of the supremacy of conscience, or, to put it in another way, of the authority of righteousness, is at once a fact and a standard of judgment. To work out the legitimate sequences of the fact as vindicating the moral order of the cosmos, as witnessing to a supreme moral personality manifesting himself in that order, and as indicating the necessity of construing the universe in the terms of personality, is one of the most fascinating and rewardful tasks of the modern theologian. But the authority of righteousness is also a criterion of values, and we are sure of the truth of every insight that clarifies and ennobles the moral ideal.

Newman, also, made a contribution to a more comprehensive view in his doctrine of the interior conviction. Butler has hardly a word about the internal evidence of Christianity. He only refers to it to corroborate the external argument. Newman, on the contrary, makes the self-evidencing power of the truth primary, and his quest is to confirm it by external evidence. At bottom this position of Newman was a return to the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, to the doctrine of John Calvin, of John Wesley, and of Jonathan Edwards. Calvin said that "it was preposterous to attempt by discussion to rear up a full faith in Scripture." Our confidence "must be derived from a higher source than human conjectures, judgments, or reasons; namely the secret testimony of the Spirit." [13] The Bible approves itself by its own clear illumination. No one could surpass Calvin in his emphasis upon the self-evidencing power of the Truth. In comparison with that the authority of the Church or of external miracles is secondary. Jonathan Edwards speaks to the same intent:

[12] The Place of Christ in Modern Theology, p. 11.

[13] Institutes, I, vii, 4.

The gospel of the blessed God does not go abroad abegging for its evidence so much as some think: it has its highest and most proper evidence in itself. . . . Unless men may come to a reasonable solid persuasion of the truth of the gospel . . . by a sight of its glory, it is impossible that those who are illiterate and unacquainted with history should have any thorough and effectual conviction of it at all. . . . After all that learned men have said to them there will remain innumerable doubts on their minds: they will be ready when pinched with some great trial of faith to say: "How do I know this or that? How do I know when these histories were written? Learned men . . . tell there is equal reason to believe these facts, as any whatsoever that are related at such a distance: but how do I know that other facts which are related at such a distance ever were?"

All this has a strangely modern sound. Edwards evidently was sympathetic with many of the questions now raised in our churches and lecture-rooms. His answer was just what we might expect:

He that sees the beauty of holiness or true moral good, sees the greatest and most important thing in the world. . . . Unless this is seen nothing is seen that is worth seeing: for there is no other true excellence or beauty. Unless this be understood nothing is understood worthy the exercise of the noble faculty of understanding. This is the beauty of the Godhead, the divinity of divinity (if I may so speak), the good of the infinite fountain of good.[14]

In a sense this answer of the soul to spiritual realities is one with the verifications of truth imparted by the sense of the authority of righteousness, but the inward response we are now contemplating is that of the whole personality.

> All thoughts, all passions, all delights,
> Whatever stirs this mortal frame,

are the agents and media of this verdict. The spirit of man becomes aware of the congruity between itself and truth, and witnesses to it. Whether this self-evidencing power of the truth is due to the structure of the soul, to the Testimonium Spiritus

[14] Edwards's Works, V, 186, Dwight's Edition.

Sancti, to the mystic endowment, or to the quality of truth, is of secondary consequence to the fact itself.

These principles of certitude are to be supplemented by a third, which both Butler and Newman recognized, as all Christian thinkers in some measure have done. In the sermons of both it underlies the discussion like the granite ledges under a New England hillside. It may be called the pragmatic sanction—the witness of experience. In the act of "doing the truth" we unseal in our own hearts a fountain of assurance. The absolute self-surrender of the personal life to the moral conviction marks the beginning of a spiritual experience which, in normal lives, is not pathological like most of the instances described in Professor James's *Varieties of Christian Experience*, but thoroughly physiological and balanced. The normal Christian experience does not introduce fantastic spirits into the soul: it drives evil spirits thence, and leaves the man clothed and in his right mind. This moral conviction may be as to a definite act of righteousness, or as to the duty of a generic choice, or as to the claims of Jesus Christ, for even these register themselves in consciousness as a moral conviction, and there is no essential difference between the choice to tell the truth against the strong temptation to lie and yielding one's self to the claims of Christ. The inward harmony, the confidence, the divine peace—the peace that passes understanding—which follow self-surrender to a moral conviction, are among the most impressive aspects of the inner life as it has been recorded through the ages.

In regard to the relative importance of the internal and external evidences for religious truth, Butler and Newman represent two distinct types of thought. Butler seems to stake everything on the preponderance of the evidence. Newman starts out with an irrefragable interior conviction as to God. And yet, in the authority of conscience Butler recognized a certitude that is not given by argument, and Newman, who believed so thoroughly in the interior conviction, went to Rome for an external authority. And both recognized the subtle but convincing verification of experience.

When therefore Butler and Newman are asked, In view of what principles does the normal mind come to certitude as to religious

truth? though they differ widely in their philosophy and their outlook, they appear to agree in answering that we reach religious certitude in view of the sense of the authority of righteousness; in view of the mysterious responses of the human spirit to truth, corroborated by the conclusions of the reason; and in view of the verifications of experience.